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This paper investigates the effects of different degrees of wage setting centralisation on the
incentive of a MNE to locate in a host country, and on the host country's welfare. Decentralised
and centralised wage bargaining are considered. The nature of product market competition
between the MNE and domestic ®rms proves crucial to results which cast doubt on some of the
conventional wisdom on FDI. In particular, we show that: (i) it is not always welfare improving to
attract inward FDI, and (ii) the MNE may prefer centralised to decentralised wage setting
regimes.
The last few decades have witnessed a substantial growth of foreign direct
investment (FDI). As a result, increasing attention has been devoted in policy
debates to the welfare consequences of FDI for the host country and to the
factors affecting multinationals' choice of location. A consensus seems to have
emerged around some commonly accepted views which form a `conventional
wisdom' on FDI. Three of these conventional views are: (1) Inward FDI is
welfare improving for a host country, regardless of the type of labour market
institutions; (2) Multinational enterprises (MNEs) prefer decentralised ®rm
level wage bargaining processes to centralised ones; (3) Governments should
subsidise inward FDI, in particular in the presence of unionised labour
markets.
The ®rst of these conventional wisdoms concerns the welfare effects of FDI for
the host country. Although different interest groups within an economy may
hold con¯icting views as to the desirability of inward FDI, it is probably
appropriate to state that on balance governments see it as welfare improving.1
Thus, increasingly, `international competitiveness' is not only meant to re¯ect
the ability of a country to compete on international goods markets, but also its
attractiveness to foreign MNEs.
The second conventional wisdom relates to the determinants of multina-
tionals' choice of location, amongst which labour market characteristics and
institutions are considered major factors. According to the emerging consen-
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1 Typical bene®ts associated with inward FDI are increased employment, technological externalities,
emergence of new and/or more dynamic sectors, procompetitive effects on industry structure. Amongst
its costs is the excessive competitive pressure on home ®rms which may force them out of business
rather than stimulate their ef®ciency. Furthermore, as Zhao (1995) and Lahiri and Ono (1997) point
out, the possible emergence of cross-hauling in FDI, may induce an `export of jobs' thus outweighing
the creation of new jobs by the inward FDI.
sus, MNEs prefer ¯exible non-unionised labour markets and, when union-
isation is in place, decentralised ®rm level wage bargaining processes over
centralised ones. Despite ample empirical evidence (UN Investment Report,
1997) suggesting that labour costs are just one of the many considerations
behind MNEs' location decisions, this view rests on the assumption that they
are crucial in determining countries' ability to compete for FDI: by increasing
labour costs, unionisation is detrimental to a country's attractiveness to MNEs.
This type of argument has often been used in relatively highly unionised
industrialised countries to endorse legislation aimed at limiting unions' power
and deregulating the bargaining process.
The third conventional wisdom is almost a corollary of the other two. The
desirability of inward FDI suggests the need for subsidising it, in particular
when unionised labour markets are likely to make a host country less attractive
to foreign MNEs. It is in fact common practice for national governments to
subsidise and to compete for inward FDI.2
This paper attempts to evaluate the conventional wisdom outlined above in
the context of unionised labour markets.
The interaction between labour market unionisation and FDI has received
surprisingly little attention in the theoretical literature where the two have
mostly been studied separately. A notable exception is Zhao (1995, 1998)
where cross-hauling FDI is generated between two countries with imperfectly
competitive product markets and unionised labour markets. Naylor and
Santoni (1998) analyse the effects of union power and degree of substitut-
ability between products on FDI.
Within the unionisation-FDI literature, our paper is the ®rst of which we are
aware to: (1) examine whether the degree of centralisation of union bargain-
ing matters for MNEs' incentives to locate in a host country and for the policy
towards FDI when unions extract rents from MNEs;3 and (2) study the role of
different modes of product market interaction between MNEs and domestic
®rms. The focus of our analysis may be especially relevant to Europe where
labour markets are generally highly unionised but where the degree of
centralisation varies greatly across countries (Freeman and Katz, 1995) and
where countries are characterised by different patterns of inwards FDI (Barrel
and Pain, 1997).
We consider two alternative wage setting regimes. The ®rst is decentralised,
with trade unions bargaining individually with each ®rm. In the second a
centralised union sets the wage(s) for an industry or group of industries.
Our analysis shows that the results crucially depend on the nature of product
market interaction between the MNE and the host country's ®rms. We con-
sider two situations. In the ®rst there is no product market interaction, and the
MNE does not compete with home ®rms either in the domestic or in any other
2 Bond and Guisinger (1985) study the effects of regional incentive programmes on the location
decisions of MNEs. Haaparanta (1996) analyses the effects of tax competition between two countries on
the allocation of an exogenously given amount of FDI by a MNE between them.
3 Bughin and Vannini (1995) were probably the ®rst to highlight the rent-extracting role of unions
with FDI. Their model, however, does not address any of these points.
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market. This allows us to isolate the effects of wage determination on the host
country's welfare and on the MNE's decisions. We subsequently allow for
product market interaction, which could occur in either the domestic or in an
export market. This is not an academic distinction but one which may be seen
as re¯ecting the motives behind a MNE's decision to locate in a host country.
When the latter is seen by the MNE as an export base, the absence of direct
competition with domestic ®rms is a plausible assumption. This is more likely
the smaller is the economic size of the host country relative to the MNE's
export market. A typical example of this is Ireland: its high share of inward
FDI, which could not be ascribed to the extent of its domestic market, has
mainly occurred in sectors which did not have a signi®cant presence of
indigenous ®rms. If, however, the MNE is attracted by domestic sales, it is likely
(particularly in relatively large industrialised countries) that it will face compe-
tition from the host country's ®rms.
The model is developed in the next section. Sections 2 and 3 look at the
alternative product market interaction cases, carry out welfare comparisons
across different regimes and discuss the implications for policy towards FDI.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
1. The Model Set-up
Consider a multinational which may set up in a host country where N
symmetric domestic ®rms are already located. All ®rms (including the MNE)
are unionised.
We model the interaction between agents as a three-stage game. In stage
one, the MNE decides whether to locate in the host country. In stage two,
unions choose the wages at which labour will be supplied to ®rms. The focus
of our analysis is on comparing different wage setting regimes. To isolate their
effect it is convenient to hold constant the relative bargaining power of unions.
In this context, it is simplest to assume that unions are monopoly wage setters.
Two alternative wage setting regimes are considered. The ®rst is decentralised
with the unions bargaining individually with each ®rm. In the second, the wage
bargaining is concluded centrally and one wage is set for all ®rms in the
country. We shall also allow for the possibility that the centralised union may
set a different wage for the MNE. In stage three, ®rms choose their output
levels. Two types of product market competition are analysed: (1) the home
®rms and the MNE do not compete in the product market and the MNE
exports all of its output. In this case we shall also rule out competition between
domestic ®rms;4 (2) domestic ®rms and the MNE all compete in the same
market which may or may not be the home market itself.
Thus, with decentralised wage setting there is no link between the home
®rms and the MNE. However, when bargaining is centralised, the wage setting
process represents such a link. With direct product market competition, the
4 As documented by Barry and Bradley (1997), this situation is broadly consistent with the Irish
experience.
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MNE and the domestic ®rms are connected via the product market even with
decentralised bargaining.
The MNE has a revenue function R(y, D)  yp(y, D) where y and p
are the MNE's output and price and D is the output of its competitors. The
revenue function for a typical home ®rm will be Ri(qi , Di)  qipi(qi , Di)
where qi and pi are its output and price, and Di is the output of all its
competitors (this may include the multinational). In order to obtain de®nite
results, we shall adopt linear demand functions.
If the MNE locates, it will hire labour at a wage w, set in stage two by the
unions.
For a ®rm to prosper in a foreign environment, it will generally possess some
®rm speci®c advantages (Dunning, 1988). In this paper, we assume this ®rm-
speci®c advantage to consist of a higher labour productivity, resulting for
instance from technical superiority and/or higher capital intensity.5 The pro®t
function of the multinational is then:
ð  R(y, D)ÿ wL(y, á)ÿ F , (1)
where L is the labour employed in its host country's operation and F is a
®xed cost which may include the cost of capital. In particular, we shall assume
that the MNEs' constant labour input requirement is á  L=y < 1.
The typical home ®rm's pro®t function is:
ði  Ri(qi , Di)ÿ wiLi , (2)
where Li  qi is labour employed.
The ®rm-speci®c unions' utility functions for the the multinational and the
typical home ®rm are respectively:
U   (w ÿ w)L (3)
and
U i  (wi ÿ w)Li , (4)
where w is the constant wage paid to non-unionised workers.6
The national welfare function is given by:
W  CS  U  Pn
i
(ði  U i), (5)
where consumer surplus (CS) is zero when ®rms only export and is positive
when ®rms sell to home consumers.
The stage-three ®rst-order conditions for the choice of output of the multi-
national and the typical home ®rm are respectively given by
Ry ÿ wá  0 (6)
5 Evidence suggests that MNEs typically have a higher productivity than domestic ®rms (e.g. Davies
and Lyons, 1992, and Barry and Bradley, 1997).
6 We assume that employment and wages have the same weights in the unions' utility functions. One
could easily allow for different weights, but this would not yield many additional insights in this context.
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and
Rq i ÿ wi  0: (7)
In stage two the unions choose wages to maximise total labour rents. We
assume a right-to-manage model where ®rms retain discretion over employ-
ment decisions.
First assume that wages are set on a decentralised basis by unions which are
monopolists at the ®rm level. In this case the particular wage in the multi-
national sector will be w  wm . The ®rst-order condition for the union in the
multinational is:
@U 
@wm
 (wm ÿ w) @L

@wm
 L  0 (8)
and that for a typical domestic ®rm's union is:
@U i
@wi
 (wi ÿ w) @L
i
@wi
 Li  0: (9)
Instead, with centralised bargaining, a single wage is set to maximise the
sum of the individual unions' utilities: V  U   NU . This implies the follow-
ing ®rst order condition:
dV
dwc
 (wc ÿ w) @Ë
@wc
Ë  0, (10)
where wc  w  w is the centralised wage and Ë  NLi  L is total employ-
ment.
In stage one of the game, the MNE will locate if its pro®t ð is greater than a
reservation pro®t ð which is assumed to be exogenous and to re¯ect the pro®t
opportunities of locating elsewhere. The exogeneity of ð implies that the host
country is small in the market for FDI.
2. No Product Market Interaction
In the absence of product market interaction between the MNE and the
domestic ®rms, the MNE is assumed to export all its output.
2.1. Decentralised Wage Setting
When unions set wages on a decentralised basis the equilibrium values of
wages are implicitly given by (8) and (9).
The linear demand functions facing the ®rms are:
p  a ÿ 1
s y and p
i  a ÿ 1
si
qi , (11)
where the parameter si represents a typical home ®rm's market size, and s is
similarly de®ned for the multinational (in this case Di  D  0). Symmetry
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among domestic ®rms implies that s  si 8i (but s may differ from s). From
(8) and (9) we then obtain:
wm  1
2
w  a
á
 
(12)
and
w  1
2
(w  a), (13)
where w is the symmetric domestic ®rms' wage. Given that á < 1, it is obvious
that wm > w: the higher relative labour productivity of the multinational
enables its union to extract a higher wage than that extracted from domestic
®rms.7
2.2. Centralised Wage Setting
When the centralised unions choose a common wage for all ®rms in the
industry, the equilibrium wage is implicitly given by (10) which, given (11),
yields
wc  1
2
w  a(á Ã)
á2  Ã
 
, (14)
where Ã  Ns=s is an inverse measure of the MNE's market size relative to the
total of the market sizes of domestic ®rms and re¯ects the relative labour
market importance of the multinational sector from the point of view of the
unions. Equation (14) implies dwc=dÃ, 0 that is, the greater the relative
market share of the MNE the higher is the centralised wage. Furthermore, it is
easy to show that wc lies strictly between the two decentralised wages (wm and
wi), as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Thus, the centralised wage is always lower than the decentralised wage paid
by the multinational, because even in the absence of product market inter-
action, centralisation generates a labour market link between the MNE and
the domestic ®rms. Taking this link into account, the unions choose to limit
rent extraction from the MNE, in order to maintain employment in the less
ef®cient domestic sector. This also explains the seemingly paradoxical impact
of a ceteris paribus increase in the labour productivity of the MNE on the
centralised wage. Although it raises the potential for rent extraction from the
MNE, a lower á does not always result in a higher centralised wage. It can be
shown that if á is suf®ciently low dwc=dá. 0. This is because unions face a
trade-off between wage and employment and a high wc will damage employ-
ment not only in the MNE but also in the domestic sector. To protect employ-
ment, the unions may choose to reduce the wage. This would not occur in the
7 This is consistent with the evidence that MNEs typically pay higher wages than their domestic
counterparts (e.g. Drif®eld, 1996).
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decentralised case where the domestic sector is not a concern for the MNE's
union.
2.3. Welfare and Pro®ts
It is commonly argued that FDI is welfare improving for the receiving country.
To assess this view we shall evaluate the welfare value of the MNE to the host
country, de®ned as the ceteris paribus difference between the levels of welfare
achieved with and without the MNE.
The conventional wisdom holds without market interaction, when the
welfare value of FDI is positive regardless of the type of wage setting. It is easy
to show that W j ÿ W a . 0 for j  d, c where the superscript j refers to the
wage setting regime and the subscript a refers to the absence of the MNE.8
The welfare value, however, is lower under centralised than under decentra-
lised wage setting, because rent extraction from the MNE is lower with wage
centralisation and there are negative spill-over effects of the higher centra-
lised wage on domestic ®rms' pro®tability. It follows that the actual welfare
level is higher under decentralised than under centralised wage setting (i.e.
W d . W c).
The commonly held view that MNEs prefer ®rm-level wage setting processes
to centralised ones is not supported by our analysis in the absence of direct
product market competition with domestic ®rms, given that wm . wc implies
higher MNE's pro®ts under centralised wage setting. Hence, a divergence of
interests emerges between the MNE and the host country's government, with
Fig. 1. The Centralised Wage without Product Market Interaction
8 Given the absence of market interaction, W a is identical under the two wage regimes.
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centralised wage setting making entry more attractive to the MNE but leading
to lower welfare levels.
The policy implication of this analysis is that when the MNE and the
domestic ®rms do not directly compete with each other in the product market,
it is desirable for a host country's government to attract inward FDI. In this
case, the government will be willing to pay a lump-sum location subsidy up to
the welfare value of the MNE. Clearly, the subsidy, which would be higher
under decentralised wage setting, would only be required if ð < ð.
3. Product Market Interaction
We now assume product market competition between the multinational and
the domestic ®rms. Let ®rms produce an identical commodity, with the
industry's inverse demand function given by
p  a ÿ b(Q  y), (15)
where Q PNi qi . Hence, in the MNE's revenue function D  Q , and in the
revenue function of the typical home ®rm Di  y PNj 6i qj .
3.1. Decentralised Wage Setting
In the decentralised bargaining case unions play Nash, so when a typical home
union i chooses its wage wi it takes as given wm and the wages set by all other
domestic unions (wÿi). Symmetry implies that all domestic ®rms will face the
same equilibrium wage (i.e. wi  w, 8i). Thus, using (8) and (9), we obtain
the positively sloped reaction functions:
wm  ì(w, á) and w  ì(wm , á), (16)
which de®ne an equilibrium in wages.
It is straightforward to show that, although dwm=dá, 0, the MNE's marginal
cost cm  áwm falls as labour productivity rises. Fig. 2 gives the locus of the
multinational's marginal cost as a function of the marginal cost of domestic
®rms (MM) and the locus of the home ®rms' marginal cost as a function of the
MNE's (HH). An exogenous decrease in á shifts the MM curve to the left and
this results in a fall in both c and c (c falls despite the fact that when á falls
the union can extract higher wages). This improves the MNE's cost competi-
tiveness relative to that of domestic ®rms and forces domestic ®rms' unions to
accept a lower wage.9
3.2. Centralised Wage Setting
Under centralised bargaining the equilibrium wage is obtained from (10)
which, given (15), yields
9 It is straightforward to show that a fall in á commits the MNE to a higher output and reduces its
rivals' output.
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wc  1
2
w  a(á N )
á2(N  1) 2N (1ÿ á)
 
: (17)
Contrary to the non-market interaction case when wc always lies below wm ,
when the MNE competes with domestic ®rms in the product market we have
wc . wm for suf®ciently large N and á. This is due to cooperative behaviour by
the centralised unions which, by internalising product market externalities, set
a higher wage.10
3.3. Welfare and Pro®ts
With market interaction, when looking at the effects of inward FDI on the host
country's welfare, it is important to distinguish between the cases in which
®rms do and do not sell in the domestic market.
3.3.1. No domestic sales
When ®rms are exporting only, the welfare value of inward FDI is negative
under both decentralised and centralised wage settings, at least for N . 1 (i.e.,
W j ÿ W ja , 0 for j  d, c). This is because the introduction of a new (foreign)
Fig. 2. The Marginal Costs of the MNE and of a Typical Home Country Firm
10 As in the no market interaction case, dwc=dá will be positive for suf®ciently large N and small á.
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®rm into the export sector of the economy has a negative effect on the terms
of trade.11 At low N and high á the welfare costs of a MNE entering the export
sector are greater under decentralised bargaining, but this is reversed when
the MNE is very productive (á low), in which case the much higher centralised
wage has serious negative consequences for the pro®tability of domestic ®rms.
Having considered the welfare values (W j ÿ W ja), we turn to the discussion
of welfare levels in order to determine the government's preferred bargaining
regime, in the presence of FDI. We ®nd that W d , W c (for suf®ciently large á
and N ). This is because in this case wc . wm and the higher centralised wage
would act like an export tax: it yields rents to domestic residents (the unions)
and it reduces output through an increase in the export price, moving the
economy towards the monopoly output level. Despite the fact that wc . wm , it
is straightforward to show that the MNE prefers to locate in the host country
under centralised rather than under decentralised wage setting (except for á
very close to unity), because in this case the higher centralised wage hurts its
host country's rivals more than itself. Hence, for suf®ciently large á and N a
congruence of interest applies between the MNE and the government, with
both preferring the centralised wage setting regime.
3.3.2. Firms sell domestically
When ®rms are selling on the home market, the pro-competitive effect of the
extra ®rm bene®ts consumer surplus.12 Nevertheless, the possibility of welfare
gains is normally restricted to the decentralised wage setting case, with the
welfare value of inward FDI being typically negative under wage centralisation,
particularly for low N and low á. This is because the negative effects of the
MNE on home ®rms via the centralised wage outweighs any gains to consu-
mers.
Turning now from welfare values to welfare levels, we can show that
W d . W c . With domestic sales, the tax-like effect of the higher centralised
wage always results in welfare being higher under decentralised than under
centralised wage setting. Thus, in contrast to the case in which ®rms export
only, a con¯ict of interest between the MNE and the host country government
would normally arise.
3.3.3. The centralised ®rm speci®c wage setting
It is worth noting that the centralised wage setting process considered so far
assumes that the centralised union sets a single wage for all ®rms. However,
the existence of labour productivity gaps between ®rms may encourage unions
11 Of course, if the MNE was already exporting into the foreign market, FDI would not introduce a
new competitor and the welfare losses to the host country would be lower than here. The exact effect of
this on welfare would depend on the cost competitiveness of the MNE's operation outside the home
country. We ignore this possibility here because our concern is with cross comparisons between
centralised and decentralised wage settings.
12 This pro-competitive bene®t would be lower if the MNE already exported to the home market.
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to set different wages for different ®rms cooperatively.13 Given the assumed
symmetry of domestic ®rms, this would imply the setting of a single wage for
the domestic ®rms and a different wage for the MNE. With no market
interaction, this case collapses into the decentralised wage setting regime. With
market interaction, the centralised union will exploit the higher productivity
of the foreign ®rm by setting a MNE-speci®c wage which exceeds that paid by
the host country's ®rms. This higher wage implies that the welfare value of the
MNE would typically be positive when ®rms compete in the domestic market.
This is in sharp contrast to the standard non-discriminatory centralised wage
setting regime discussed above. Inward FDI would still typically be welfare
reducing when ®rms compete in an export market (at least for suf®ciently
large á). The losses, however, would be smaller than in the decentralised and
standard centralised regimes.
3.3.4. Comparison of market interaction with no-market interaction
Except (i) in the `centralised ®rm speci®c wage setting' case under market
interaction, and (ii) when its productivity advantage is extremely small, the
MNE will prefer a centralised wage setting regime (with and without market
interaction), thus contradicting one of the conventional wisdoms mentioned
in the introduction.
With respect to the welfare value of inward FDI, we ®nd that direct product
market competition makes welfare losses from inward FDI more likely, because
the MNE will capture market shares from the indigenous ®rms, thus reducing
their pro®ts. This will have a direct adverse effect on welfare, not compensated
by the entrant's pro®ts which are repatriated. The fall in welfare will often be
larger under wage centralisation because of the additional externality on
domestic ®rms generated by the common industry wide-wage.
The overall policy implication of these results is that there are circumstances
in which the government would prefer to prevent entry, unless it could raise a
location tax at least equal to the negative `welfare value' of FDI.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper focuses on the nature of product market interaction between a
MNE and domestic ®rms in examining the effects of different degrees of wage
setting centralisation on the incentive of a MNE to locate in the host country
and on the host country's welfare.
Our results suggest that there may be circumstances in which it will not be
desirable for a government to encourage inward FDI. We ®nd that negative
welfare effects of FDI occur when there is direct product market competition
between the MNE and the host country's ®rms. In this case the foreign MNE
will effectively capture market shares from indigenous ®rms thus reducing
their pro®ts. This effect is shown to be particularly strong in the presence of
13 We are indebted to a referee for suggesting this case.
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centralised wage setting processes. Hence, we highlight a channel through
which inward FDI can have adverse effects on the host country's welfare.
Clearly, in real world situations the net change in welfare would depend on
many other factors (e.g. technical spill-overs from foreign ®rms). However, we
believe that our ®ndings, which cast at least some doubts on the general
validity of the commonly held view that FDI is always welfare improving, are
intuitive and are consistent with some of the empirical evidence on FDI (see
Caves (1996) for a discussion of the effects of FDI on market structure and
indigenous ®rms pro®tability). Therefore, our analysis points to the need for
empirical research to disentangle the relative importance of this and of the
other factors which determine the welfare effects of FDI on the receiving
country.
We also show that, contrary to what is frequently argued, in the absence of
taxes/subsidies, the MNE will be less likely to locate in the host country under
a decentralised than under a centralised wage setting regime, despite the fact
that the latter will typically yield higher wages.
Many natural extensions suggest themselves, such as technological spill-overs
from MNEs to domestic ®rms, experimenting with different degrees of
bargaining power of the unions, and examining cases in which the MNE can
negotiate special union arrangements with the host country's government.
Also, in the paper we have limited the policy analysis to direct, lump-sum
polices towards the MNE; a richer menu of instruments, such as wage policies,
are clearly worth considering. These topics are left for future research.
University College, Dublin
University of Dundee
References
Barrel R. and Pain N. (1997). `The growth of foreign direct investment in Europe', National Institute
Economic Review, issue 160, pp. 63±75.
Barry, F. and Bradley, J. (1997). `FDI and trade: the Irish host-country experience'. Economic Journal,
vol. 107, pp. 1798±811.
Bond, E. and Guisinger, S. (1985). `Investment incentives as tariff substitutes: a comprehensive measure
of protection', Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 67, pp. 91±7.
Bughin, J. and Vannini, S. (1995). `Strategic direct investment under unionised oligopoly', International
Journal of Industrial Organisation, vol. 13, pp. 127±45.
Caves R. E. (1996). Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Davies, S. W. and Lyons, B. R. (1992). `Characterising relative performance: the productivity advantage
of foreign owned ®rms in the U.K.', Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 43, pp. 584±95.
Drif®eld, N. L. (1996). Global Competition and the Labour Market, Reading: Harwood.
Dunning, J. H. (1988). `The eclectic paradigm of international production: a restatement of some
possible extensions', Journal of International Business Studies, vol. 19, pp.1±29.
Freeman, R. B. and Katz, L. F. (1995). Differences and Changes in Wage Structures, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Haaparanta, P. (1996). `Competition for foreign direct investment', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 63,
pp. 141±53.
Lahiri, S. and Ono, Y. (1997). `Tax policy on foreign direct investment in the presence of cross-hauling',
University of Essex Discussion Paper No. 472.
Naylor, R. and Santoni, M. (1998). `Wage bargaining and foreign direct investment', mimeo, University
of Warwick.
2000] C91U N I O N I S A T I O N A N D F O R E I G N D I R E C T I N V E S T M E N T
# Royal Economic Society 2000
United Nations (1997). World Investment Report: Transnational Corporation, Market Structure and Competition
Policy, New York and Geneva.
Zhao, L. (1995). `Cross-hauling direct foreign investment and unionised oligopoly', European Economic
Review, vol. 39, pp. 1237±53.
Zhao, L. (1998). `The impact of foreign direct investment on wages and employment', Oxford Economic
Papers, vol. 50, pp. 284±301.
# Royal Economic Society 2000
C92 [ M A R C H 2000]T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L
